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SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY: THE RIGHT OF
THE STATE DEPARTMENT AND THE
DUTY OF THE COURT
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals in Petrol Shipping Corp. v.
Kingdom of Greece' granted absolute immunity from suit to the King-
dom of Greece, which had agreed to arbitrate all contract claims arising
from the transaction. The Court ignored the State Department's 1952
"Tate Policy" 2 and resorted to the 1940 Puente v. Spanish National
States case to settle the issue. The "Tate Policy," introduced by the
State Department, advocates the theory of restrictive immunity from
suit and provides the correct procedure by which the question may be
raised. In the current case, Justice Clark dissented strongly saying, "Had
this ever been the law and common practice it is surely not so now." 4
A diversity of opinion exists as to the necessity and practicality of
State Department guidance. As international relations fluctuate, it
should be the right of the State Department to advise, and the duty of
the court to inquire and listen. The practice has been favorably accepted
for the past twelve years, but cannot yet be said to be settled procedure.
Consequently, an historical review of the problems attached to the
Petrol case and other immunity cases will show the wisdom of con-
tinuing the "Tate Policy."
THE SUBSTANTIVE ISSUE
Historically, the rule of sovereign immunity may be traced to the
Roman law maxim "par in parem non habet judicium" ' and to the
maxim of English law, "the King can do no wrong." In 1576, after
the Reformation, the first explicit formulation of the doctrine of
sovereignty was expressed in the De Republica of Jean Bodin.6 Sover-
eignty for Bodin was an essential principle of internal political order;
the sovereign per se was to be a constitutional ruler subordinate to
1. Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom of Greece, 326 F.2d 117 (2d Cir. 1964).
2. Letter from Acting Legal Advisor Jack B. Tate to the Acting Attorney General
Philip B. Perman, May 19, 1952, in 26 Dept. State Bull. 984 (1952).
S. Puente v. Spanish National State, 116 F.2d 43 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 314 U.S. 627
(1940).
4. Supra, note I at 119.
5. An equal has no authority over an equal.
6. BRiERLY, THE LAW OF NATIONS, 1-93 (6th Ed. 1963).
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the fundamental law of the state. Bodin could not foresee that federa-
tion would divide sovereign powers without producing chaos.1
Political philosophers in the promulgation of their ideas have in fact
varied the original doctrine in two major respects. One is the identifica-
tion of sovereignty as an absolute power above the law; the other, that
powers, privileges, rights and immunities, originally attributes of a
personal ruler, became the attributes of the State in its relations with
other states.8
The United States, influenced by writers advocating various theories
of government, was eclectic when facing the problem of applying any
of the above principles to a democracy. In a democracy, if one accepts
the premise that a sovereign is omnipotent, who then is the sovereign?
All the people cannot rule; if the majority rules and is all powerful,
there is a denial of the rights of the minorities, except those rights which
the majority allows.
Hamilton proposed that each State of the Union, still possessing at-
tributes of sovereignty, be immune from suit, without consent, unless
there has been surrender of the immunity in the plan of the convention.
".... The contracts between a Nation and an individual are only binding
on the conscience of the sovereign and have no pretensions to com-
pulsive force. They confer no rights of action independent of the
sovereign will." "I
The United States Constitution clearly implies that consent to be
sued is required of the sovereign." This unanimously accepted doc-
trine was not restricted by the Eleventh Amendment.-
Influenced by many theorists-and not encumbered by stringent Con-
stitutional provisions, the United States Judiciary has relied on different
arguments for the granting of absolute immunity from suit. Among
7. United States v. Lanza, 260 U.S. 377, 382 (1922), Taft, C.J, "two sovereignities,
deriving power from different sources, capable of dealing with the same subject matter
(sc prohibitions) within the same territory."
8. BiUmaty, op. cit. supra, note 6.
9. Ibid.
10. The Federalist No. 81 (Hamilton), quoted in Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S.
571 (1934).
11. U.S. CONsr. ART. III S 9.
12. Accord, People of Puerto Rico v. Rosaly, 227 U.S. 270 (1913); United States v.
Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882); Anderson v. Speyer, 115 N.Y.S.2d 132 (1952); Hassard v.
United States of Mexico, 61 N.Y. Supp. 939 (1899).
13. US. CoNsr. AvmEND. XI. See, discussion of Constitutional provision in Principality
of Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313 (1933).
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these are: the equality and dignity of each state,'4 reciprocity, 5 privi-
lege," ' and comity.' The practical reasons advanced are lack of juris-
diction, as execution or seizure may not be levied,18 and the need to
avoid embarrassing the executive. 9 However, the natural result of
granting absolute immunity is a reluctance by private traders to deal
with states. ° In a contract with a state, the private individual in the
event of breach is left without "his day in court."
Following the First World War,2 1 the change created in national
economies by the emergence of state-owned commercial enterprise
competing with private industry necessitated 22 a more definite policy
regarding immunity. Thus, to place reasonable limits on State im-
munity, the courts began to draw distinctions between acts jure gestionis
(private sovereign acts) and jure imperii (public sovereign acts).
One hundred years prior, in the Schooner Exchange case,23 the
foundation had been established when the Court first distinguished acts
14. The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, 7 Cranch 116 (1812). Accord, Nankivel
v. Omsk All-Russian Gov't, 237 N.Y. 150, 142 N.E. 569 (1928) [Granting of immunity
was not limited to recognized governments.], Kawananakea v. Polybank, 205 U.S. 349
(1907) [Granting of immunity not confined to powers sovoreign in the full sense of
juridical theory, but extended to actual administrations.], Telkes v. Hungarian National
Museum, 38 N.YS.2d 419 (1942) [The existence of war did not operate as a bar to
immunity.].
15. The Beaton Park, 65 F. Supp. 211 (W.D. Wash. 1946), discussed but immunity not
granted for other reasons. See, generally, Evans, Should Sovereign Immunity be Gov-
erned by Reciprocity? 1958 PROC. AM. Soc. INT'L L. 85.
16. Lynch v. United States, 292 U.S. 571 (1934); Valarino v. Thompson, 7 N.Y. 576
(1853).
17. The Adriatic, 258 Fed. 902 (3rd Cir. 1919); The Janko (The Norsetank), 54
F. Supp. 241 (ED.N.Y. 1944); Sullivan v. State of Sao Paulo, 36 F. Supp. 503 (ED.N.Y.
1941); The Augustine, 8 F.2d 287 (S.D.N.Y. 1924); Anderson v. N.V. Transandine
Handelmaatschappig, 289 N.Y. 9 (1942).
18. Lauterpacht, The Problem of Jurisdictional lnnnunities of Foreign States, 28 BrT.
YB lNr'L L. 220 (1951).
19. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882). The Athanasios, 228 Fed. 558 (S.D.
N.Y. 1915); Weilman and McCloskey v. Chase Manhattan, 192 N.Y.S.2d 469 (1959);
Associated Metals and Minerals Corp. v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 43 N.Y.S.2d 829 (1943).
20. Fensterwald, Sovereign Immunity and Soviet State Training, 63 HARv. L. REv. 614
(1950).
21. Hervey, The Immunity of Foreign States When Engaged in Commercial Enter-
prises, 27 Micr. L. REv. 751 (1928).
22. Borchard, Governmental Responsibility in Tort, 36 YALE L. J. 1, 3 (1926), re-
flecting criticism of U. S. policy: "Only in democratic England and republican
America do we find the absolutist metaphysics of divine right and sovereign immunity
arrayed in the full regalia of their theological vestments, reincarnating for a twentieth
century society the ancient credo of Bodin and Hobbes."
23. 7 Cranch 116 (1812).
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jure gestionis from acts jure imperii. The rules of comity and ex-
pedience outlined therein became applicable in admiralty or in regular
law courts to all suits involving foreign states, their property and agents,
in rem or in personam. The courts from 1818-1918 granted immunity
to ships in public service,24 to agencies for public service,25 to con-
tracts made for the public good,26 but denied immunity when a govern-
ment became a partner in a trading corporation.
In 1918 the State Department made its first attempt to provide some
substantive guideline for the courts, expressing the view: "where (gov-
ernment-owned) vessels were engaged in commercial pursuits, they
should be subject to the obligations and restrictions of trade, if they
were to enjoy its benefits and profits." Secretary Lansing offered the
following reasons:
(1) when a sovereign enters into business, he submits himself to
the conditions thereof, (2) if merchant vessels owned and operated
by foreign governments are immune from process in United States
Courts, added force would be given to the claim of neutral Govern-
ments who are taking over their merchant marine ... that they should
be also immune from the operation of municipal regulations in United
States Ports, (3) if the claim of immunity were granted, American
citizens as well as foreigners would be left -without recourse in the
Courts for such just claims as they might have against the vessels con-
cerned, and their only means for obtaining satisfaction would be
through political channels-either through Congress or through
diplomacy.2
The Attorney General refused to adopt the suggestions of the State
Department,29 and for the next eight years the courts vascillated be-
24. The Roseric, 254 Fed. 154 (D. NJ. 1918); Briggs v. Light-Boats, 93 Mass. 157
(1865); The Parlement Beige, L. R. 5 P. D. 197 (1880). But immunity denied a
public ship in violation of our neutrality: The Santissima Trinidad, 7 Wheat. 283 (1822).
25. Mason v. Intercolonial Ry. of Canada, 197 Mass. 349, 83 N.E. 876 (1908).
26. Kingdom of Roumania v. Guaranty Trust Co., 250 Fed. 341 (2nd Cir. 1918).
27. The Bank of the United States v. The Planters' Bank of Georgia, 9 Wheat. 904,
907 (1824). Justice Marshall: "It is, we think a sound principle that when a government
becomes a partner in any trading company, it devests itself, so far as concerns the
transactions of that company of its sovereign character and takes that of a private
citizen. Instead of communicating to the company its privileges and its prerogatives,
it descends to a level with those with whom it associates itself and takes the character
which belongs to its associates, and to the business which is to be transacted"
28. Letter from Secretary Lansing to Attorney General Gregory, Nov. 8, 1918, MS.
Dept. of State, file 195/229a.
29. Letter from Mr. Gregory to Mr. Lansing, Nov. 25, 1918, M.S. Dept. of State,
file 195/236.
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tween absolute immunity ° and the restrictive immunity3l which the
foreign courts were advocating.32
The Supreme Court in 1926 ultimately adopted the rule of absolute
immunity in Berizzi Bros. Co. v. Pesaro.33 In this case, a ship owned and
possessed by a friendly government was utilized in the carriage of
merchandise for hire in the interest and service of the nation and was
therefore held to be a public ship immune from arrest under process
in an in rem action by a private suitor. Although some courts followed
this principle, 34 other courts preserving the logic of jure gestionis, denied
absolute immunity.35 Proposals of writers and jurists36 had not estab-
30. Merchant vessels: The Carlo Poma, 259 Fed. 369 (2nd Cir. 1919), The Augustine,
8 F.2d 287 (S.D. N.Y. 1924); The Rodgay (spelling varies), 279 Fed. 130 (N.D. Cal.
1920); The Maipo, 252 Fed. 627 (S.D. N.Y. 1918), aff., 259 Fed. 367 (S.D. N.Y. 1919).
Public service vessels: The Western Maid, 257 U.S. 419 (1921). Governmental functions
(railroads): Oliver American Trading Co. v. Gov't of U. S. of Mexico, 5 F.2d 659
(2nd Cir. 1924); Bradford v. Dir. Gen. of RR's, 278 S.W. 251 (1925). Governmental
corporations: Dunlap v. Banco Central del Ecuador, 41 N.Y.S.2d 650 (1943); U.S.
Grain Corp. v. Phillips, 261 U.S. 106 (1922).
31. Merchant vessel: The Florence H., 248 Fed. 1012 (S.D. N.Y. 1918). Governmental
corporation: Molina v. Comision Reguladora del Mercado de Henequen, 91 N.J.L.
382, 103 Ad. 397 (1918). Partially controlled governmental corporation: Coale V
Societe Co-Operative Suisse des Charbons, Basle, 21 F.2d 180 (S.D. N.Y. 1921).
Government entering into contracts: Royal Italian Gov't v. National B. and C. Tube
Co., 294 Fed. 23 (2nd Cir. 1923).
32. E.g., Mixed Courts of Egypt 1910-1930; Comprised of jurists from leading Euro-
pean-Anglo-Saxon Countries. Dame Marigo Kildani Veuve Nicolas Bey Haggar contre
Jean Gregoriou Nicolas Elipoulos, le Ministre des Finances du Gouvernement Hellinquc,
.Mai 9, 1912, Bulletin, Vol. 24, p. 330, Gazette, Vol. II, p. 161, generally from the
Hague Court, the late President Lodec quoted by Phillimore, "Immunite des Etats".
Academic de Droit International, Recucil des Cours, 1925, Vol. III, p. 468.
33. 277 Fed. 473 (S.D. N.Y. 1921), 255 U.S. 216 (1921), 13 F.2d 468 (S.D. N.Y. 1926).
271 U.S. 562 (1926).
34. Public vessels: Compania Espanola v. Navemar, 303 U.S. 68 (1938); United
States v. Jardin, 81 F.2d 745 (5th Cir. 1935); In re Investigation of World Arrangements.
137 F.R.D. 280 (D.C. 1952) (dictum); The Janko (The Norsetank), 54 F. Supp. 241
(E.D. N.Y. 1944); The Ljubica Matkovic, 49 F. Supp. 936 (S.D. N.Y. 1943); The
Frederick, 43 F. Supp. 1015 (E.D. N.Y. 1942); Stone Engineering Co. v. Petroleos
.Mexicanos of Mexico, 352 Pa. 12, 42 A.2d 57 (1945). Museum: Telles v. Hungarian Na-
tional Museum, 38 N.Y.S.2d 419, 265 App. D. 992, 39 N.Y.S. 986 (1942). Professional
services: Puente v. Spanish National State, supra, note 2.
35. Merchant vessels: Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1944); The
Beaton Park, 65 F. Supp. 211 (W.D. Wash. 1946). Government stockholder in cor-
poration: Amtorg Trading Corp. v. United States, 71 F.2d 524 (C.C.P.A. 1934); Hannes
v. Kingdom of Roumania Monopolies Institute, 20 N.Y.S.2d 825, 24 N.Y.S.2d 994, 260
App.D. 189 (1940); Ulem and Co. v. Bank Gospodarstwa Krajawego, 24 N.Y.S.2d 201,
25 N.Y.S.2d 1002, 261 App.D. 838 (1940).
36. E.g., proposed by the Harvard Research in International Law in 1932: "A State
Vol. 6:70
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lished a logical basis for the distinction between public and private acts
by a sovereign. Should the nature or the purpose of the act be the dis-
tinguishing feature?37 The transaction may be public or private de-
pending upon whether or not the state is socialist, communist or
capitalist. These variations in economic structures make obscure the
differentiation of private from public acts.
THE TATE LE'TER
With a further increase of State trading and nationalization of enter-
prise, after the Second World War the United States needed a definitive
policy regarding immunity. Thus in 1952 the State Department, for the
second time, in an advisory capacity, concluded that absolute immunity
should not be granted in certain types of cases. The facts influencing
this decision were set forth in the Tate Letter. First, the United States,
although not a signatory party to the treaty, had nevertheless ratified
the Brussels Convention of 1926 under which immunity for govern-
ment-owned vessels was waived. More important, Greece, Belgium,
Italy, France, Switzerland, Austria, Peru, Denmark, Egypt and Rou-
mania have renounced the theory of absolute immunity and are follow-
ing the restrictive theory. Schools of influential writers favoring the
restrictive theory were also observed in countries still favoring the
classical absolutist theory. The view of juridical writers in a civil law
country is a major factor in the development of the law.38
The State Department feels that continued full acceptance of the
absolute theory finds little support except in the United Kingdom and
the Soviet Union and its satellites.
Furthermore, the granting of sovereign immunity to foreign gov-
ernments in the courts of the United States is most inconsistent with
the action of the government of the United States in subjecting itself
may be made a respondent in a proceeding in a court of another state, when in the
territory of such other state, it engages in an industrial, commercial, financial, or
other business enterprise in which private persons may then engage or does an act
there in connection with such enterprise wherever conducted and the proceeding is
based upon the conduct of such enterprise or upon such act."
37. The "nature test" e.g., would categorize all purchases of goods as commercial,
because private parties are able to perform these actions. The "purpose test" applies
if the government is not purchasing for profit or resale, but to benefit the people.
See, generally, Bishop, New U. S. Policy Limiting Sovereign mnmunity, 47 Am. J. IN-r'l. L.
93 (1953). The Jurisdictional Immunity of Foreign Sovereigns, 63 YALE L.J. 1148 (1954).
38. Letter from Acting Legal Advisor Jack B. Tate to the Attorney General, Philip
B. Perman, May 19, 1952 in 26 Dept. State Bull. 984 (1952).
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to suit in these same courts in both contract and tort, and with its
long established policy of not claiming immunity in foreign jurisdic-
tions for its merchant vessels. Finally, the Department feels that the
wide-spread and increasing practice on the part of governments of
engaging in commerce makes necessary a practice which will hereafter
be the Department's policy to follow the restrictive theory of sovereign
immunity in the consideration of requests of foreign governments for
a grant of sovereign immunity.39
It is realized that a shift in policy by the executive cannot control
the courts but it is felt that the courts are less likely to allow a plea
of sovereign immunity where the executive has declined to do so.
There have been indications that at least some Justices of the Supreme
Court feel that in this matter courts should follow the branch of the
government charged with responsibility for the conduct of foreign
relations. 40
The Tate Letter has had notable results, and to understand these
effects, the role of the State Department in relation to the judiciary must
be examined.
THE ROLE OF THE STATE DEPARTMENT
The Act of 1789,"' from which the present statute42 is derived, em-
powers the Legal Advisor of the Department of State to furnish advice
concerning all legal problems involving either domestic or international
law which arise in the course of the Department's work. The Legal
Advisor is appointed by the President with the advice and consent of the
Senate. 3 The courts defer to the Department of State in two types of
situations: (1) Where the Department speaks essentially as the Presi-
dent's agent in executing foreign policy4" and (2) Where the Depart-
ment speaks primarily as an administrative agency with special expertise
in the field of foreign relations and International Law.45 As early as
39. Id. at 985, and see, discussion: Leonard, The U. S. as a Litigant in Foreign
Courts, 1958 PROC. AM. Soc. INT'L L. 95.
40. Supra, note 38 at 985.
41. ACT oF JuLY 27, 1789, 1 STAT. 28.
42. R. S. 202 (5 U.S.C. 156).
43. Bilder, The Office of the Legal Advisor, 56 AM. J. INT'L L. 633 (1962).
44. United States v. Pink, 315 U.S. 203 (1942); United States v. Belmont, 301 U.S.
324 (1937); United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936);
Terlinden v. Ames, 184 U.S. 270 (1902); Jones v. United States, 137 U.S. 202 (1890);
United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882); Briehl v. Dulles, 248 F.2d 561 (D.C. 1957).
45. Recognition of foreign governments: Latvian State Cargo and Passenger Line T.
McGrath, 188 F.2d 1000, 342 US. 816 (1951); Guaranty Trust Co. v. United States,
[Vol. 6:70
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1803, Justice Marshall, describing foreign affairs powers as executive
and beyond judicial control in Marbury v. Madison said, "The subjects
are political. They respect the nation, not individual rights and being
intrusted to the executive the decision of the executive is conclusive." 4
PRESENTATION OF THE ISSUE
In addition to raising the substantive issue of restrictive immunity, the
Tate Policy raises the procedural point of how immunity is best pre-
sented to the courts.47 An understanding of the procedural problem in
presentation is necessary to appreciate the current position of the State
Department.
Since 1796, the accepted practice of the State Department has been
the filing of a suggestion of immunity by the Attorney General of the
United States or a law officer acting under his direction.48 Otherwise,
304 U.S. 126 (1938); Oetjen v. Central Leather Co, 246 U.S. 297 (1918); Kenneth v.
Chambers, 14 How. 38 (1852); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Republic of China,
254 F.2d 177 (4th Cit. 1958); Bank of China v. Wells Fargo Bank and U. T. Co, 92
F. Supp. 920 (N.D. Cal. 1950); The Penza, 277 Fed. 91 (ED. N.Y. 1921). Foreign
Governments bringing suit: Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbitino, 84 S. Ct. 923 (1964);
Colombia v. Cauca Co., 190 U.S. 524 (1903); The Sapphire, 11 Wall 164 (1870);
Calderone v. Naviera Vacuba, 325 F.2d 76 (2nd Cir. 1963); Pang-Tsu Mou v. Republic
of China, 201 F.2d 195 (D.C. 1952); Compania Ron Bacardi v. Bank of Nova Scotia, 193
F. Supp. 814 (S.D. N.Y. 1961); Unrecognized government cannot bring suit: Clark
v. Allen, 331 U.S. 503 (1947); Doe ex dem Clark v. Braden, 16 How. 635 L.E. 1090
(1853); Ivanceric v. Artukovic, 211 F.2d 565 (9 Cir. 1954). Acquisition of new lands:
Wilson v. Shaw, 204 US. 24 (1907). Resolution of disputed sovereignities: In re
Cooper, 143 U.S. 472, (1892). Regarding the Immigration Act: Carlson v. Landor, 342
U.S. 524 (1952); U.S. ex rel. Knauff v. Shaughnessy, 338 U.S. 537 (1950); Rogers v.
Cheng Fu Sheng, 280 F.2d 663 (D.C. 1960). War crimes: Koki Hirota v. McArthur, 33
U.S. 197 (1949); Bernstein v. N. V. Nederlandsche-Amerikaansche, 210 F.2d 375 (2d
Cir. 1954). Allocation of international airway: Chicago and Southern Airline v. Water-
man Steamship Corp, 333 U.S. 103 (1948). Miscellaneous: P and E Shipping Corp. v.
Banco Para El Commercio Exterior de Cuba, 307 F.2d 415 (1st Cir. 1962); 14 SYMACUSE
L. REv. 517 (1963); Wolchok v. Stalni Banka Ceskoslovenska, 222 N.YS.2d 140, (1961);
Anderson v. N.V. Transandine Handelmaatschappig, 289 N.Y. 9 (1942). See generally,
Federal Intervention in Private Actions Involving Public Interest, 65 HARV. L. REv. 319
(1961).
46. Marburv v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 166 (1803).
47. Supra, note 38 at 985: ". . . In order that your Department, which is charged
with representing the interests of the government before the Courts, may be adequately
informed it will be the Department's practice to advise you of all requests by foreign
governments for the grant of immunity from suit and of the Department's action
thereon."
48. Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon, supra, note 23; The Cassius, 2 Dall. 635 (1796);
The Attulita, 238 Fed. 909 (4th Cir. 1916); Hassard v. U. S. of Mexico, 61 N.Y.
Supp. 939 (1899); contra: Molina v. Comision Reguladora, Mercado de Henequen,
1965]
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the State Department merely certified the person making the suggestion
as an accredited diplomatic official. 49
The first authoritative disapproval of the latter practice was Ex parte
Muir, decided by the Supreme Court in 1921.-5 In a libel suit against the
vessel for damage from collision, the counsel for the British Embassy
appeared as arnici curiae and suggested the process be quashed as the
British Government had requisitioned the ship. The suggestion was
overruled and the ship's master applied to the Supreme Court for a
writ of prohibition to prevent the District Court from proceeding with
the suit. The basis of the Court's decision was the discretionary issuance
of a writ of prohibition. However, in a powerful and often quoted
dictum, the Court referred to the amici curiae procedure as:
• . . a marked departure from what theretofore had been recognized
as the correct practice and in our opinion the libelant's objection to it
was well taken. The reasons underlying that practice are as applicable
and cogent now as in the beginning, and are sufficiently indicated by
observing that it makes for better international relations, conforms
to diplomatic usage in other matters, accords to the Executive Depart-
ment the respect rightly due to it and tends to promote harmony of
action and uniformity of decision. 51
To raise the question properly the foreign State or its authorized repre-
sentative must appear as a suitor,
... and if there was objection to appearing as a suitor in a foreign
court, it was open to that government to make the asserted public
status and immunity of the vessel the subject of diplomatic representa-
tion to the end that, if that claim was recognized by the Executive
Department of this government, it might be set forth and supported
in an appropriate suggestion to the court by the Attorney General or
some law officer acting under his direction.52
91 N. J. L. 382, 103 Atl. 397 (1918) (counsel for corp. not qualified); Gul Djemal, 296
Fed. 563 (S.D. N.Y. 1920) (master of ship not qualified); The Anne, 3 Wheat 435 (1818)
(consul not qualified).
49. Amici curiae: The Roseric, 254 Fed. 154 (D.C. N.J. 1918). Charge d'Affairs: The
Maipo, 252 Fed. 627 (S.D. N.Y. 1918). Consul accompanied by a certificate of the
Russian Ambassador and the State Dept.: The Rogday (spelling varies), 279 Fed. 130
(N.D. Cal. 1920). See generally, Feller, Procedure in Cases Involving Inruznity of
Foreign State in Courts of the United States, 25 AM. J. INT'L L. 83 (1931).
50. Ex parte Muir, 254 U.S. 522 (1921).
51. Id. at 533.
52. Id. at 532, this dicta was the basis of the decision in the Pesaro case, siupra, note 33.
[Vol. 6:70
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The request claiming immunity is submitted to the State Department
by the party or his home government. 53 After State Department action,
the suggestion 54 is filed by the Justice Department. The courts have
given varying effects to the State Department advice, considering it a
conduit,55 an instruction,5 a recognition and allowance, 7 or a conclusive
determination. " Since 1937, most courts have considered the State
Department's voice a conclusive determination of the policy. Of course,
the courts have been free to determine issues not affecting international
or diplomatic relations. 59 When the State Department refused to act
the Court has relied on an accredited representative. 0 The fluctuations
of the court in allowing an accredited representative,"' rather than ad-
hering to the Ex parte Muir procedure, 2 frustrated some actions. In
addition, several New York courts felt the action would not lie if the
petition did not affirmatively assert the sovereign's consent to the suit. 3
53. Deak, The Plea of Sovereign Ivmunity and the New York Court of Appeals, 40
COL. L. REV. 453 (1940); Judicial Deference to the State Department on International
Legal Issues, 97 U. OF P. L. R. 79 (1948).
54. Suggestion was first mentioned in United States v. Peters, 3 Dall. 121 (1795).
55. Piascik v. British Ministry of War Transport, 54 F. Supp. 487 (S.D. N.Y. 1943);
Lamont v. Travelers Ins. Co., 284 N.Y. 633, 29 N.E.2d 939 (1940). The Augustine, 8
F.2d 287 (SD. N.Y. 1924). The Sao Vicente, 260 U.S. 151 (1922). Ex parte Muir,
supra, note 50.
56. Sullivan v. State of Sao Paulo, 36 F. Supp. 503 (ED. N.Y. 1941).
57. Treated as recognition and allowance but denied effect: Uleni and Co. v. Bank
Gospodarstwa Krajawego, 24 N.Y.S.2d 201, 25 N.Y.S.2d 1002, 261 App. D. 838 (1940).
58. Chicago and Southern Airlines, Inc. v. Watermans Steamship Corp, 333 U.S.
103 (1948); Republic of Mexico v. Hoffman, 324 U.S. 30 (1944); Ex parte Republic
of Peru, 318 U.S. 578, (1943); The Maret, 145 F.2d 431 (3rd Cir. 1944); The Navemar,
103 F.2d 783 (2nd Cir. 1939); Erwin v. Quintanilla, 99 F.2d 935 (5th Cir. 1938); Miller
v. Ferrocarrill Del Pacifico de Nicaragena, 137 Me. 251, 18 A.2d 688 (1941); United
States of Mexico v. Schmuck, 294 N.Y. 265, 62 N.E. 264 (1945); Associated Metals and
Minerals Corp. v. Petroleos Mexicanos, 43 N.Y.2d 829 (1943); Fields v. Predionica
Thanica 31 N.Y.S2d 739, 263 App. D. 155 (1941); Stone Engineering Co. v. Petroleos
Mexicanos of Mexico, 352 Pa. 12, 42 A.2d 57 (1945); Westchester County v. Ranollo,
67 N.Y.S.2d 31; New Rochelle City Ct. (1948).
59. E.g., Banco de Espana v. Federal Reserve Bank, 114 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1940);
In re Investigation of World Arrangements, 13 F.R.D. 280 (D.C. 1952).
60. Compania Espanola v. Navemar, 303 U.S. 68 (1938).
61. The Ljubica Matkovic, 49 F. Supp. 936 (S.D. N.Y. 1943); Government of France
v. lsbrandtsen-Moller Co., 48 F. Supp. 631 (S.D. N.Y. 1943); The Frederick, 43 F. Supp.
1015 (E.D. N.Y. 1942); Federmal Motorship Corp. v. Johnson and Higgins, 77 N.Y.S.2d
52 (1948); De Simone v. Transportes Maritimos Do Estado, 191 N.Y. Supp. 864, 200
App. D. 82, 192 N.Y. Supp. 815 (1922).
62. E.g., Societa Commerciale Italiana Di Navigazione v. Mara Nay. Co, 280 Fed.
334 (4th Cir. 1922); United States of Mexico v. Rusk, 4 P.2d 981, Cal. (1931); Holzer
v. Deutsche Reichsbahn Gessellschaft, 289 N.Y. Supp. 943, 160 Misc. 597 (1936).
1 63. Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom of Greece, supra, note 1; Puente v. Spanish
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In other jurisdictions when the sovereign institutes the suit, he is con-
sidered a private suitor, thus subject to counterclaims. 4
When formulated, the Tate Letter advocated a change in the exist-
ing immunity from suit. Alteration of the existing policy of absolute
immunity from attachment, execution and seizure was not intended. 5
According to the early construction of the Letter, the State Department
considered acts jure gestionis not entitled to immunity, and funds could
not be attached for jurisdiction; consequently actions were dismissed.6
This interpretation rendered the Tate Letter illusory, so in the 1961
Stephen v. Zivnostenska Banka case a communique was issued allowing
attachment of property to obtain jurisdiction over a foreign nation.-
However, on the basis of comity, attachment was not extended to
execution for judgment.6 Some critics feel the State Department should
have further strengthened the Tate Policy;6 others feel the judicial
limitation by the State Department was unwarranted. 0 The vast ma-
jority of courts, however, have accepted the doctrine in toto, acceding
to the procedural aspect and thus to the substantive policy.7
National State, supra, note 2; Adatto v. United States of Venezuela, 181 F.2d 501 (2d
Cir. 1950), aff'd, on authority of Puente case; Landley v. Republic of Panama, 31
F. Supp. 230 (S.D. N.Y. 1940).
64. E.g., National City Bank of New York v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356,
(1954); Claudy, The Tate Letter and the National City Bank Case, 1958 PROc. Am.
Soc. INT'L L. 80; United States v. National City Bank of New York, 83 F.2d 236, 299
U.S. 563 (1936); United States v. The Thekla, 266 U.S. 328 (1924); Republic of China v.
American Express, 195 F.2d 230 (2d Cir. 1952). When immunity is waived it may not
be later asserted in the same suit: Richardson v. Fajardo Sugar Co., 241 U.S. 44
(1916); Kunglig Jarnvagsstyrelsen v. Dexter and Carpenter, 300 Fed. 891, 43 F.2d 705
(2d Cir. 1930).
65. Re, Nationalization and the Investment of Capital Abroad, 42 GEO. L.J 44 (1953).
66. New York and Cuba Mail Co. v. Republic of Korea, 132 F. Supp. 684 (S.D. N.Y.
1955); Weilaman and McClosky v. Chase Manhattan, 192 N.Y.S.2d 469 (1959).
67. 222 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1961).
68. Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, 197 F. Supp. 710, aff'd, 295 F.2d 44 (E.D. Va. 1961),
DUKE L.J. 582 (1962); 13 SYRtCUSE L. REv. 492 (1962); Three Stars Trading Co. v.
Republic of Cuba, 222 N.Y.S.2d 675 (1961), 13 SYvACUsE L. REv. 494 (1962). The State
Department intervened at the appellate court level: Republic of Cuba v. Arcada Build-
ing of Savannah, Inc., 123 S.E.2d 453 (Ga. 1961); Republic of Cuba v. Dixie Paint and
Varnish Co., 104 Ga. App. 854, 123 S.E.2d 198 (1961); State ex rel. National Institute
of Agrarian Reform v. Dekle, 137 So.2d 581, Fla. (1962). Plea is too late if entered
after execution sales: United States v. Harris and Co. Advertising, 149 So. 384 (Dist. Cr.
App. 1963).
69. The First Decade of the Tate Policy, 60 MICH. L. Rev. 1142 (1962).
70. 61 MicH. L. REv. 396 (1962).
71. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbitino, 84 Sup. Ct. 923 (1964), National City
Bank of N. Y. v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356 (1954); Republic of China v. Mayan
Lines, 145 So.2d 679 (4th Cir. 1962); Flota Maritima Browning v. Motor Vessel Cuidad.
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THE ACT OF STATE DOCTRINE
Another applicable tenent of immunity, introduced in the 1796
Waters v. Collot" case, was promulgated by the Supreme Court in
Underhill v. Hernandez.73
Every sovereign state is bound to respect the independence of every
other sovereign state and the courts of one country will not sit in
judgment on the acts of the government of another done within its
own territory. Redress of grievances by reason of such acts must be
obtained through the means open to be availed of by sovereign
powers as between themselves.74
Known as the Act of State Doctrine, well entrenched since 1918,"6
this principle applies"0 even when the action of the foreign state is
illegal under municipal lawY.7
Two basic reasons for this doctrine are: (1) the peaceful intercourse
218 F. Supp. 938 (D. Md. 1963); Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, 197 F. Supp. 710, aff'd,
295 F.2d 44 (E.D. Va. 1961); New York and Cuba Mail Co. v. Republic of Korea,
132 F. Supp. 684 (S.D. N.Y. 1955); Fla.: National Institute of Agrarian Reform v. Kane,
153 So.2d 40, (Fla. 1963); United States v. Harris and Co. Advertising, 149 So. 2d 384
(Dist. Ct. App. 1963); State ex rel National Institute of Agrarian Reform v. Dekle, 137
So. 2d 581 (Fla. 1962); Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Steckel, 134 So.2d 23 (Fla. 1961);
Harris and Co. Advertising v. Republic of China, 127 So.2d 687 (Fla. 1961); Georgia:
Republic of Cuba v. Arcada Building of Savannah, 123 S.E.2d 453 (Ga. 1961); Republic
of Cuba v. Dixie Paint and Varnish Co., 104 Ga. App. 854, 123 S.E.2d 198 (1961); New
York: Mirabella v. Banco Industrial de la Republic Argentina, 237 N.Y.S.2d 499, 38
Misc.2d 128 (1963); Three Stars Trading Co. v. Republic of Cuba, 222 N.Y.S.2d 675
(1961); Stephen v. Zivnostenska Banka, 222 N.Y.S.2d 128 (1961); Pacific Molasses v.
Comite de Ventes de Mieles, 219 N.Y.S.2d 1018 (1961); Weilaman and McClosky v.
Chase Manhattan, 192 N.Y.S.2d 469 (1959). Contra: Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom
of Greece, supra, note 1; Knocklong Corp. v. Kingdom of Afghanistan, 167 N.Y.S.2d
285 (1957).
72. Waters v. Collot, 2 U.S. (2 Dal].) 246 (1796).
73. 168 U.S. 250 (1897).
74. Id. at page 252 and 457.
75. Ricaud v. American Metal, 246 U.S. 304 (1918).
76. Pons v. Republic of Cuba, 294 F.2d 925 (D.C. Cir. 1961); Banco de Espana v.
Federal Reserve Bank, 114 F.2d 438 (2d Cir. 1940). Administration no longer in power,
principle applied unless the State Department indicates a contrary intention: Bernstein
v. Van Heyghen Freres, 163 F.2d 246 (2d Cir. 1947), cert. den, 332 U.S. 772. Not a
de jure Gov't.: Saliminoff v. Standard Oil Co., 262 N.Y. 220 (1933).
77. Banco Nacional de Cuba v. Sabbitino, 84 Sup. Ct. 923 (1964). Lillich, A Pyrrhic
Victory at Foley Square, The Second Circuit and Sabbitino, 8 VmrL. L. REy. 155 (1963).
The Extent to Which the Act of State is and Should Be Applied in U. S. Courts, 44
B.U.L. REv. 86 (1964). Contra: (because Nazi acts were considered in flagrant disregard
of our public policy) Bernstein v. N. V. Nederlandsche Amerikaansche Maatschappig,
173 F.2d 71 (2d Cir. 1949).
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of states can best be predicated on the basis of respect for other sover-
eigns, and (2) the established practice of judicial deference to the State
Department in matters involving public policy.7" No adverse effect on
foreign relations has been noticed between countries who do not apply
the doctrine; thus, the most valid attack of the former reason is based
on reciprocity." "There is no evidence of any diplomatic protest against
a judicial decision which failed to adhere to it (Act of State Doc-
trine)." 80 In addition to matters of public policy, courts should defer
to the State Department questions involving international territorial
disputes, recognition, exclusion and explusion of aliens, interpretations
of treaties and immunities."' In these situations, the Court may not
have all the facts or the diplomatic channels through which to obtain
them. The State Department should have the right to apply the Act
of State Doctrine consistently. 2 This practice would be more equitable
to private suitors8 3 and consonant in theory with the Tate Letter.
THE PETROL CASE
In Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom of Greece," the influential
Second Circuit Court of Appeals totally ignored the Tate Policy. As
the court sits in a commercial capital of the world, it is especially
regrettable since foreign representatives may question whether the
United States is reverting to the absolute immunity policy of the
twenties. Twelve years after the formulation of the Tate Policy, the
majority prejudicially based their decision on the 1940 Puente case.,:,
They made no criticism of the Tate Policy, but in effect they criticised
in the safest manner-silence.
In the Petrol case, petitioner moved for an order directing the Greek
Ministry of Commerce to proceed to arbitration of damages arising
78. See generally, Sims, Act of State v. International Law, 13 MERCER L. REv. 370
(1962); Zander, The Act of State Doctrine, 53 AM. J. INT'L L. 826 (1959); Sovereign
lnunity and the Act of State Doctrine, 75 HARV. L. REv. 1607 (1962).
79. The Extent to Which the Act of State Doctrine is and Should be Applied in
U. S. Courts, 44 B.U.L. REv. 86 (1964); Hyde, The Act of State Doctrine and the
Rule of Law, 53 Am. J. INT'L L. 635 (1959).
80. Mann, International Delinquencies Before Municipal Courts, 70 L.Q. REv. 181,
198 (1954); Mann, Sacrosanctity of Foreign Acts of State, 59 L.Q. REv. 42 (1943).
81. Dickinson, The Law of Nations as National Law, 104 U. OF P. L. REv. 451 (1956).
82. Accord: National Institute of Agrarian Reform v. Kane, 153 So. 2d 40 (1963).
83. Cardoza, M. H., Sovereign Immunity: The Plaintiff Deserves a Day in Court, 67
HFARv. L. REv. 608 (1954).
84. Petrol Shipping Corp. v. Kingdom of Greece, supra, note 1.
85. Puente v. Spanish National State, supra, note 2.
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from respondent's charter of petitioner's tanker to transport grain to
Greece. Appearing specially, the Greek Ambassador to the United
States suggested want of jurisdiction to sue a sovereign without con-
sent. The lower court sustained respondent's motion and the petitioner
appealed. There is every indication the State Department would have
declared the acts jure gestionis and not supported the defense, par-
ticularly as the proceeding was not to seek the enforcement of a final
decree but merely to require the respondent to appoint an arbitrator.
The affirmance of immunity by the Second Circuit Court of Appeals
accords to Greece a privilege that would not be extended to the United
States in Greek courts.86 Furthermore, the decision repudiates the pro-
gress in thinking and logic of the last forty years.
CONCLUSIONS
Various criticisms of the Tate Policy have been advanced: the State
Department has usurped the judiciary power; 7 the plaintiff is left with-
out a formal hearing, without the benefit of advocacy, and without
procedural safeguards. In addition, delays by the State Department may
be costly to the plaintiff. Furthermore, the Department may not take
action in cases of severed diplomatic relations or unrecognized states.
An ever-present possibility is conflict with the United Nations Trea-
ties.88
Critics and dissenting courts must be made aware of the two basic
problems the policy is seeking to remedy. In foreign policy today:
(1) the United States must speak with one voice and that voice must
be the most qualified; (2) the determination of the issues must be ex-
pedient and harmonious with the accepted rules of International Law.""
Unhampered by procedural practices of resolving immunity, the State
86. Greek courts have assumed jurisdiction in actions involving state activities (jure
gestionis). Consular Premises (Greece case), Annual Digest 1931-1932, case no. 187,
Soviet Republic (Immunity in Greece) case, Themis, vol. 40, p. 486, Annual Digest
1927-1928, case no. 109. Greece is also mentioned in the Tate Letter as reversing in
the 1920's their support of absolute immunity to embrace the restrictive theory.
87. See, generally, Cardoza, M. H., Recognition of Prerogatives or Abdication to
Usurper, 48 CORNELL L.Q. 461 (1963). Contra: Jessup, Has the Supreme Court Abdicated
One of its Functions? 40 AM. J. INT'L L. 168 (1946).
88. See, Ehrenfeld, United Nations Immunity Distinguished from Sovereign imnunity,
1958 PRoc. AM. Soc. INT'L L. 88.
89. E.g., The United States has signed a Convention which clearly rejects the absolutist
theory as to maritime vessels, Convention of the Territorial Seas and the Contiguous
Zone, U.N. Doc. No. A/Conf. 13/L. 52 (1958), reprinted in 52 Am. J. Int'l L. 834
(1958).
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Department is able to analyze actual business relations and consider
the effect of the problem and resolution on existing or non-existing
diplomatic relations with the sovereign in question.
Provisions for a hearing with the Legal Advisor and his staff would
guarantee a formal hearing, the benefit of advocacy, and procedural
safeguards.
When unwilling to express an opinion, the State Department should
immediately advise the court. This practice would negate complaints
of unnecessary delay and the possibility of misunderstanding the position
of the State Department.
The courts have not abdicated their power to the State Department,
nor has the State Department usurped the function of the courts. Never
has there been a policy affecting international relations that the execu-
tive in his wisdom could not change. Thus, it is the duty of the judiciary
to allow the State Department to exercise its right of flexibility. "Flexi-
bility, not uniformity must be the controlling factor in times of strained
international relations." 90
Penelope Dalton
90. Rich v. Naviera Vacuba, Hoffman, 197 F. Supp. 710, 724, aff'd, 295 F.2d 44 (1961).
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